tibet: setting the stage for dialogue

TibetInfoNet Update 29 April 2008

China's official news agency Xinhua announced on 25 April 2008
that a meeting would take place "in the coming days" between
"a private representative" of the Dalai Lama and "the relevant
department of the central government". The announcement
follows a series of statements by the Chinese authorities that
portrayed themselves as "patiently keeping contact with the
Dalai Lama side" while accusing the Tibetan leader of "destroying
the base for dialogue". Although the announcement, issued
while China held consultations with the EU, is a conspicuous
attempt at appeasement, the ground for dialogue with the Dalai
Lama appears to have been laid in March 2008, prior to the
Olympic torch relay debacle, with the declared purpose of
co-opting the Dalai Lama's participation into easing current
pressures. While it is too early to predict whether forthcoming
talks will bear results and what those results might be, it is clear
that another inconclusive round of dialogue would be unlikely
to serve any of the parties concerned.

The first statement hinting at a possible forthcoming meeting
was made on 31 March 2008 by Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister
of the People's Republic of China (PRC).....

 

....and number two in the Party hierarchy, in the Laotian capital
Vientiane, where he attended the third Greater Mekong Sub-Region
Summit. In an unusually moderate tone, Wen assured that "the
channels for dialogue between the Chinese government and
Dalai Lama are always open". He said that "the Chinese
government  is to continue resuming [sic] dialogues with him",
specifying with  the usual truism that this pertained as long
as the Dalai Lama  "abandons the claim for 'Tibet
independence' (...) and recognizes  both Tibet and Taiwan
as inseparable parts of China". Wen added  that readiness
for dialogue prevails "especially [if the Dalai Lama]  uses 
his influence to stop the violence in Tibet", thus implicitly
acknowledging continuing confrontations inside Tibet, in
contradiction  of official reports claiming that normality had
returned.  The speech also acknowledged the capacity of
the Dalai Lama to  appease the Tibetan masses, in
contradiction of official Chinese  media reports that continue
to portray him as the "mastermind" and "orchestrator" of
anti-social activities perpetrated by "a few  splitists" against
the wishes of most Tibetans.

A second official statement, this time by the Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu, coming two days after the
disastrous Olympic torch relay in London and almost
simultaneously with the torch relay in Paris, castigated the
Dalai Lama as a "liar", "cheater" and "serf owner", and
accused him anew in harsh words to have instigated and
orchestrated violence in Lhasa. Jiang Yu's statement also
claimed that the central government's policy towards the
Dalai Lama is "consistent" and that they had been "patiently
keeping contact with the Dalai Lama side". It concluded:
"our door to conduct dialogue with the Dalai Lama was open
in the  past and is still open now". It reiterated that, should the
Dalai Lama "change his mind, stop separatist activities, violence
and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic games (...) we are still willing
to contact and consult with him".


A third official statement then reversed international criticism
towards China for not entering into dialogue with the Dalai Lama,
by accusing him of "destroying the base for dialogue". It was
delivered by Sitar, an ethnic Tibetan and deputy head of the
United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) Central Committee (1) at a press briefing hosted by the
State Council Information Office on 9 April 2008. Apart from
reiterating theubiquitous accusation of instigating violence,
Sitar declared that the "violence" and the latest "organized
disruptions" of the Olympic torch relay, not just "greatly hurt
the feelings of the Chinese people", but also "damaged the basic
conditions and atmosphere for dialogue", thereby implying that
the Sino-Tibetan dialogue was an ongoing process. Sitar said that
"the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) always
shows the utmost sincerity and patience in keeping contact with
the Dalai Lama", adding that more than 20 of the exile leader's
delegations had visited China since 1979, including six meetings
since 2002. At least the latter, however, had been so far regularly
played down by the Chinese authorities as 'private visits' by
'oversees compatriots' to 'see their relatives' and 'experience
China's progress', a portrayal which some Tibet support groups
starkly criticised and used to demonstrate the futility of the
exercise. Sitar concluded his statement by assessing that
"the root cause for no progress after so many contacts is that
the Dalai Lama is not sincere; he has proved this by not giving
up the 'Tibet independence' stand". However, at the beginning
of his statement, Sitar also clarified "our door to conduct dialogue
with the Dalai Lama is still open now".


The Xinhua report of 25 April 2008 announcing new talks appears
to be fully in tune with these three statements. Although keen to
clarify that the meeting comes up "in view of the requests
repeatedly made" by the "Dalai side" for resuming talks, it
specifies that "the policy of the central government towards
Dalai [sic] has been consistent and the door of dialogue has
remained open". It also hints strongly that concrete outcomes
are expected: "It is hoped that through contact and consultation,
the Dalai side will take credible moves to stop activities aimed
at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting violence and stop
disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games so as to
create conditions for talks". The talks, it appears, will take place
with the United Front Line Department, the organ of the CPC
devoted to forming 'broad alliances' with non-Party and religious
social groups and among the non-Chinese (Han) ethnic population
within and outside the PRC. So far no exact date appears to
have been set for the meeting and the Central Tibetan
Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala commented  that so far
no invitations have been received.


The announcement of the forthcoming talks did not refrain
the PRC official media from continuing verbal attacks against
the Dalai Lama. A commentary posted on 27 April 2008 in the
People's Daily, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party,
said that the Dalai Lama "clique" was "playing with words to
drum for the so-called Tibet issue". An article by a Chinese
Tibetologist published by Xinhua on 28 April refered to the
Tibetan Government in Exile as "a theocratic power", pointing
to the prominence of clerics in its ranks. The article concludes
"as a result of theocratic rule, internal faction, religious
persecution and assassinations have been rife in the history
of his exiled 'government'. Many monks were expelled from
monasteries just for believing in different gods". The latter remark
seems to hint at the Dorje Shugden cult which the Dalai Lama
discouraged because of its sectarian nature, while the Chinese
authorities effectively encourage it within Tibet. During the recent
crisis, Tibetan and Western Shugden followers have stepped up
their protest activities, particularly in India.


These ongoing Chinese or Chinese-supported attacks have
raised suspicions amongst Tibetans and in the international
press that Beijing's offer for talks is not genuine. However,
the attacks might equally be a measure preparing the ground
for talks, as Beijing has often been seen to intensify pressure
before entering into tough discussions on a thorny issue with
the aim of magnifying any possible future concession. For
instance, the PRC refused for decades to acknowledge the
State of Sikkim as a part of India, although it never appeared
to have had any serious interest in the territory, and finally
China quietly abandoned its position when the Indian government
agreed to re-open the Nathu la, the pass that links Sikkim and
Tibet. More recently, China has taken up a very similar
issue about the neighbouring Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh, likely with sight on future negotiations with India
about the disputed common border. The Chinese nationalist
demonstrations which flared up following state controlled media
reports reprimanding the Tibet protests were, at least, effectively
tolerated by the authorities. This appears to conform to the same
pattern of creating bugbears to strengthen the Chinese position
for discussions, in this case on Tibet, at a national and international level.


The Chinese authorities insist that the Dalai Lama's stance on
claiming genuine autonomy rather than independence is "insincere"
as it allegedly does not match his actions. But in a similar way,
the current abrasive rhetoric alone does not provide any clue
about how far the Chinese authorities are willing to engage in
a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama. A more reliable
indicator will be the extent to which the forthcoming talks provide
concrete measures for a betterment of policies in Tibetan regions.

Notes:
1:
About Sitar and his nomination to the post, see TibetInfoNet’s
Update of 18 September 2006
(https://www.tibetinfonet.net/content/update/31)

- end -

If you'd like to comment on one of the news entries you could
browse the website on <http://www.tibetinfonet.net> and click on
the "comment" link below any news or update published there.